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Abstract
We analyze the incentives to collude when brand manufacturers compete with a private
label producer of inferior quality. Full collusion is easier to sustain than partial collusion from
the brandsperspective when horizontal di¤erentiation is large and vertical di¤erentiation is
small. The private label rm is better o¤ under full collusion than under partial collusion
if goods are su¢ ciently homogenous (horizontal and/or vertical). Partial collusion could be
preferred by the private label exactly when full collusion is easier to sustain. Improving the
private labels quality makes full collusion more likely, either because it relaxes the brand
producers incentive constraint or because it shifts the preference of the private label rm
from partial collusion to full collusion. Fully collusive behavior reveals itself through a
nonnegative price e¤ect on the brandsside caused by a quality increase of the private label
good.
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1 Introduction
We present a Salop-circle model which captures market competition between branded products
and a private label substitute.1 All products are di¤erentiated in the horizontal dimension. In
addition, the private label good is assumed to be inferior in the vertical dimension. We use
an innitely repeated game approach to examine under which circumstances full collusion of
heterogeneous rms is easier or harder to sustain than partial collusion. In the former case all
rms (the brands and their private label substitute) collude, while in the latter case only the
brands form a self-enforcing cartel.
Private label products (also called store brands) encompass all merchandise sold under a
retailers brand. Their market share has risen signicantly and today private labels are an
integral part of almost all retail markets. For instance, based on 2011 sales data of Nielsen,
private labels accounted for 42 per cent in the United Kingdom.2 Private labels were initially part
of a low-price, low-quality strategy allowing retailers to compete for price-sensitive consumers
(Hassan and Monier-Dilhan 2006). These budget private labels were often designed as me too
products and were positioned at the lower end of the quality and price spectrum. Private labels
were especially successful in markets where no strong national brands were present (European
Commission, 2011). However, over recent years they have grown in the segment of added-value
and premium products.3 Based on GfK German retailing data, Inderst (2013, Figure 3, p. 14)
reports that over the period 2007-2012 budget private labelsmarket share stayed put at around
25 per cent, while the market share of premium private labels increased from 9 per cent to 12.9
per cent over the same period.
The rise of private label products has been explained by cost savings, buyer power reasons
1Another application of our analysis are pharmaceutical products where brands and their generic equivalents
compete against each other after the end of patent protection (see Frank and Salkever, 1997).
2Market shares are calculated based on the turnover of fast-moving consumer goods, excluding fresh food.
The market shares di¤er signicantly across countries (for instance, Spain: 39%, Germany and Portugal 32%,
while Greece has the lowest with 10%). Market shares have been increasing steadily. According to European
Commission (2011), from 2003 to 2009 their share increased by 2-7 percentage points in Western and Southern
Europe (except Spain) and by 10-26 percentage points in Spain and Central Europe. Inderst (2013) provides a
survey of these developments.
3For instance, the German supermarket chain Real o¤ers its own premium labels in many product categories.
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and retailer di¤erentiation.4 The role private labels play within the context of collusion has been
largely neglected so far.5 This is surprising because collusion is an ongoing issue among food
manufacturers. In Germany, for instance, three cartel cases with food manufacturers involved
were decided recently. The co¤ee roasterscartel was a partial cartel in which only brand co¤ee
makers were found guilty of forming a cartel, while there was no evidence found that private
label producers (mainly store brands of retailers Aldi and Lidl) have participated in the cartel
(Bundeskartellamt, 2009). The co¤ee roasterscartel is remarkable, because it lasted for many
years even though it did not include the private labels which have a market share of 17 per
cent in the German co¤ee market in 2011 (Bundeskartellamt, 2014a, p. 208). In the sausage
cartel, to the opposite, private label producers participated in the cartel which included almost
all branded sausage producers (see Bundeskartellamt, 2014b). The confectionery manufacturers
cartel only included six branded products (see Bundeskartellamt, 2013).6
Behind this background our main research questions are the following: First, how do hor-
izontal product di¤erentiation and the private labels (vertical) quality a¤ect the stability of
full and partial collusion (the former being an all encompassing cartel, while the latter only in-
cludes the branded goods)? And relatedly: When is a more homogenous cartel among branded
manufacturers more likely to form than a heterogeneous cartel which also includes private label
substitutes? Second, how is the private label producers incentive to close the quality gap towards
the branded goods a¤ected by market conduct which can be competitive, partially collusive or
4Hoch and Banerji (1993) have shown that cost savings can be so large that private labels may generate even
higher prot margins than the respective national brands. Private labels can substantially enhance a retailers
bargaining position vis-à-vis brand manufacturers because it enhances their outside option (Mills, 1998, Bon-
tems, Monier-Dilhan, and Requillart, 1999, and Steiner, 2004). Moreover, private labels can increase retailer
di¤erentiation as retailers would otherwise carry the same assortment of branded goods (Gabrielsen and Sörgard,
2007).
5An exception is Steiner (2004) who warns explicitly that the issue of collusion between private label goods
and national brands may become more of an issue in the future. Interestingly, the issue of collusion between
private labels and branded goods does not play a major role in recent retailing sector inquires by competition
authorities (see, e.g., Bundeskartellamt, 2014a, Competition Commission, 2008, European Commission, 1999).
6 It should be noted that cartel cases are decided on explicit evidence of cartel formation. The question,
therefore, whether or not private label producers participated in the cartel via tacit collusion was not decided in
those cases where only brand manufacturers found guilty.
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fully collusive?
We analyze a Salop circle model with three rms that di¤er in their (vertical) quality para-
meter. Two out of three rms are high-quality brand producers, while the third rm is a private
label producer that has an inferior quality. We are interested to analyze whether collusion
among three heterogeneous rms is easier to sustain than partial collusion among the two brand
producers. We use an innitely repeated game approach to examine the stability of collusion.
We rst show that the brand producersincentive constraint is critical to obtain full collusion
over partial collusion, whenever nonparticipation of one rm leads to noncooperative market
conduct. In those instances, the private label rm always joins the brand producers for a full
collusion outcome, given that full collusion is incentive compatible for the brand manufacturers.
If, however, nonparticipation of the private label rm induces the brand manufacturers to form a
partial cartel (which is always better than noncooperative conduct), then the private label may
prefer partial collusion over full collusion. This is, ceteris paribus, more likely to be the case, the
lower the intensity of competition (i.e., the higher the horizontal product di¤erentiation) and
the larger the (vertical) quality gap between the private label and the branded goods. Thus, a
private label rm is more likely to join the branded goods producers to form an all encompassing
cartel the higher the quality of the private label good and the more intense competition are.
We also show that the incentives to increase the private labels quality is largest under
full collusion with partial collusion and noncooperative behavior following in that order. The
incentives are further enhanced by the prospect of making full collusion feasible in the rst place.
There are two reasons why a quality upgrade of the private label good can trigger full collusion.
First, it relaxes the incentive constraint for the brand producers, and second, it makes it more
likely that the private label rm prefers full collusion over partial collusion.
Our paper contributes to the collusion literature that deals with cartel stability when rms
are heterogenous.7 Häckner (1994) shows that an all-inclusive cartel is harder to sustain when
7Selten (1973) analyzes cartel stability as a coalition formation process (i.e., without referring to an innitely
repeated game context). He assumes homogeneous products and Cournot competition. Full cartelization is only
possible when there are few rms. See Prokop (1999) for a related approach within a model of price competition,
where it is also shown that the chance of full cartelization is very much limited. For a survey, see Bos and
Harrington (2010).
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products become more vertically di¤erentiated.8 Based on a spatial model of horizontal product
di¤erentiation Ross (1992) argues that increased product di¤erentiation could enhance cartel
stability (see also Chang, 1991).9 Given those results, opposing forces are present in a model
that combines variety-di¤erentiated products with (vertical) quality di¤erentiation. In addition,
partial collusion has not been addressed in those works.10 Closely related is Bos and Harrington
(2010) who analyze the sustainability of collusion (full and partial) within an innitely repeated
game framework. Their focus is on capacity asymmetries among rms, while rmsproducts
are homogenous. Overall, they show that full collusion is harder to sustain, when rms become
more asymmetric (with regard to their capacity). Moreover, smaller rms are more likely to
stay out of the cartel giving rise to partial collusion among the largest rms in the market. We
apply the same stability analysis as they do; namely, we suppose that nonparticipation of a rm
in the all encompassing cartel will keep collusion among the remaining rms if it is protable
for them.11
We also contribute to the economic analysis of private labels (for a survey, see Berges-
Sennou, Bontems, and Requillart, 2004). Price e¤ects and product positioning incentives were
analyzed in Mills (1995) and Bontems, Monier-Dilhan, Requillart (1999), and Gabrielsen and
Sörgard (2007).12 Those works focused on the strategic e¤ects within a vertical relations setting
without considering the collusion problem. Empirical works have shown ambiguous price e¤ects
of private labels on branded substitutes. Quite interestingly, Putsis (1997) and Cotterill and
Putsis (2000) have provided evidence that brands prices decreased after the introduction of
private label substitutes. In contrast, Ward et al. (2002) show a positive association of private
8A related result is obtained in Rothschild (1992).
9Thomadsen and Rhee (2007) show that collusion is always harder to sustain the more di¤erentiated the
products if costs of forming the cartel are su¢ ciently large.
10Our model builds on Economides (1989, 1993) which are early models (of the Hotelling and Salop type,
respectively) with both horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation.
11The debate about how to formalize a cartels stability in case of heterogeneous rms is ongoing (see Bos and
Harrington, 2010, for a survey). The impact of cost asymmetries in association with an indivisible cost of collusion
is analyzed in Ganslandt, Persson, and Vasconcelos (2012).
12Choi and Coughlan (2006) show (disregarding the vertical relation problem) that a private label should
position close to a strong (weak) national brand when its quality is high (low).
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labelsmarket shares and branded products prices.13 A similar relationship is uncovered in
Frank and Salkever (1997) who investigated price responses of branded pharmaceuticals after
patent protection expired and generic substitutes entered the market.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model setup and Section 3
provides the equilibrium analysis. In Section 4 we analyze the private label producers quality
incentives and we show how collusion can be detected from market data. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
We specify a variant of the Salop circle model (Salop, 1979) which combines horizontal product
di¤erentiation (as a measure of overall competition intensity) and vertical product di¤erentia-
tion (which mirrors the inferior quality of the private label vis-à-vis the branded goods). Let
there be three rms (j = 0; 1; 2) located equidistantly on the unit circle. Firms 1 and 2 produce
two brands with (vertical) quality index si, where i = 1; 2.14 Both rms are horizontally di¤er-
entiated and they are located at x1 = 1=3 and x2 = 2=3, respectively. We refer to these goods
as brands 1 and 2, respectively. Firm 0 is located at x0 = 0 on the unit circle and produces
a private label product which is a horizontally di¤erentiated variant, but of a lower (vertical)
quality s0  si for i = 1; 2. We set production costs equal to zero.15
Consumers are distributed uniformly along the unit circle with mass of one. Each consumer
buys at most one unit of the good. A consumers position x on the unit circle represents her
most preferred product variant in the horizontal dimension. The utility of a consumer with
address x 2 [0; 1] buying from rm i = 1; 2 is given by
Uxi = si   t jxi   xj   pi, (1)
where pi is rm is price. According to (1), we consider a linear transportation cost function,
13Bontemps, Orozco, and Requillart (2008) provide related evidence for France.
14We use the index i to refer only to the brands i = 1; 2, whereas the index j is used to refer to all rms
j = 0; 1; 2.
15A three-rms Salop model is also used in Rasch and Wambach (2009) to analyze the e¤ect of a two-rm
merger and internal-decision making rules on cartel stability. Yet, in their model, all products have the same
vertical quality.
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where t > 0 is the exogenously given transportation cost parameter and si is the (vertical)
quality index.16 Correspondingly, the utility of a consumer with address x buying the private
label product is given by
Ux0 = s0  minftx; t(1  x)g   p0, (2)
where s0  1 and p0 is the price charged by rm 0. We set s1 = s2 = 1 and dene s := s0 with
s 2 [0; 1]. Thus both brands are assumed to be of the same quality and their quality is higher
than the private labels quality. The quality gap between the brands and the private label is
given by 1  s  0. Consumers only buy a product if their utility is not negative.
We consider an innitely repeated price competition game to study rmscollusion incentives.
In the stage game, all rms set their prices simultaneously. All rms have the same discount
factor  2 [0; 1]. In the innitely repeated game, we focus on trigger strategies with Nash reversal
in the punishment phase.17
We consider two types of collusion: i) full collusion (FC), where all three rms collude, and ii)
partial collusion (PC), where only rms 1 and 2 collude, while rm 0 behaves noncooperatively.
In addition, we denote by N the case that all rms behave always noncooperatively.
We analyze the stability of collusion under full and partial collusion. We denote by Nj the
noncooperative (stage game) prot of rm j, by Cj the collusive (stage game) prot of rm j,
and by D;Cj the deviation prot of a colluding rm j, where the superscript C refers either to
the partial collusion case or the full collusion case; i.e., C 2 fFC;PCg. Given trigger strategies
with Nash-reversal, rm j has no incentive to deviate from the collusive behavior if and only if
the discount factor is large enough; i.e., if
  Cj :=
D;Cj   Cj
D;Cj   Nj
(3)
holds. We impose the following parameter restrictions which ensure that the market is always
16See Economides (1989) for a similar approach to combine both horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation
within a Salop model.
17We use a grim strategy as in the seminal paper of Friedman (1971) to derive rmscollusion incentives. While
this is standard practice in the tacit collusion literature (see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, Chap.
12D), optimal punishments (so-called stick-and-carrot strategies) can be more e¤ective in sustaining collusion
(see Abreu, 1986, 1988, and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1986). Both approaches can be expected to lead to
the same qualitative results (see Häckner, 1996, and Chang, 1991).
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covered in equilibrium.
Assumption 1. We restrict the analysis to all parameter pairs (t; s) which fulll the conditions
1  s  maxf1  5t=6; t=2; 13t=6  2g. The minimal possible values of t and s are tmin = 6=11
and smin = 3=8, while the maximal possible values are tmax = 18=13 and smax = 1.
Assumption 1 species the feasible set of parameters we are considering throughout the
analysis (all conditions are derived in the Appendix). Specically, restriction s  1   5t=6
ensures that the equilibrium market share and price of the private label good are positive under
noncooperative behavior. Conditions s  t=2 and s  13t=6   2 ensure that the market is
covered under full and partial collusion, respectively. Specically, condition s  t=2 implies
that the deviation price of the private label rm under full collusion is lower than its collusive
price. Finally, t  tmin = 6=11 makes sure that the deviating rm under (both partial and full)
collusion realizes a market share which is less than 100 per cent.18
Nash Equilibrium of the Stage Game. Before we analyze the innitely repeated game, we
solve the stage game to derive Nj , for j = 0; 1; 2. We rst derive the demand functions. Note
that rms are located equidistantly on the unit circle. Denote the indi¤erent consumer between
rms 0 and 1 by x0. Given prices p0 and p1 the indi¤erent consumer between rms 0 and 1 is
given by
s  p0   tx0 = 1  p1   t(1=3  x0)
which gives her location on the segment x 2 (0; 1=3):
x0 = (s+ t=3  p0 + p1   1) =(2t) for x0 2 (0; 1=3). (4)
Similarly, the indi¤erent consumer between rms 1 and 2 (denoted by x1) is obtained from
1  p1   t(x1   1=3) = 1  p2   t(2=3  x1),
which gives her location on the segment x 2 (1=3; 2=3):
x1 = (t  p1 + p2) =(2t) for x1 2 (1=3; 2=3). (5)
Finally, the indi¤erent consumer between rms 2 and 0 (denoted by x2) is given by
1  p2   t(x2   2=3) = s  p0   t(1  x2)
18The remaining maximal and minimal values of t and s follow from the restrictions that constrain s as stated
in the rst sentence of Assumption 1.
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which gives her location on the segment x 2 (2=3; 1) :
x2 = (1  s+ 5t=3 + p0   p2) =(2t) for x2 2 (2=3; 1). (6)
Using (4), (5), and (6) we can write rm js demand Dj as
Dj =
8<: x0 + 1  x2, if j = 0xj   xj 1, if j = 1; 2. (7)
Using (7) we can solve the rmsmaximization problems maxpj0 j = pjDj simultaneously to
obtain the equilibrium prices and rmsequilibrium prots under noncooperative behavior.
Proposition 1. Suppose that all rms behave noncooperatively. We obtain the following equi-
librium values:
i) Prices: pNi = (3(1   s) + 5t)=15, for i = 1; 2, and pN0 = (6(s   1) + 5t)=15. Moreover,
pN1 = p
N
2  pN0 if s  1 (with equality holding for s = 1).
ii) Prots: Ni = (5t+ 3(1  s))2 =(225t), for i = 1; 2, and N0 = (6(s  1) + 5t)2 =(225t);
moreover, N1 = 
N
2  N0 (with equality holding for s = 1).
iii) Locations of the indi¤erent consumers: xN0 = 1=6   (1   s)=(5t), xN1 = 1=2, and xN2 =
5=6 + (1  s)=(5t).
Proof. See Appendix.
Parts i) and ii) of Proposition 1 state rmsprices and prots, respectively. The prices and
prots of the brand producers decrease when the quality of the private label increases, while the
opposite holds for the private label producer. As long as the private label good is of a strictly
lower quality than the branded goods (s < 1), the brand producers realize higher prots than
the private label producer. Part iii) of Proposition 1 shows that the private label producer 0
serves the consumers with addresses (0; xN0 ) [ (xN2 ; 1), while the branded manufacturers 1 and
2 serve the consumers on the intervals (xN0 ; 1=2) and (1=2; x
N
2 ), respectively. If the quality of
the private label good is inferior, s < 1, then rm 0 serves less consumers than rms 1 and
2, despite the fact that it charges the lowest price. The relatively low quality of the private
label good reduces its equilibrium demand. This benets the brands, because they can sell their
products at a higher price and also enjoy a larger equilibrium demand. However, if rm 0s
quality increases, rms 1 and 2 face stronger competition and reduce their prices. If s = 1, then
all three rms are homogeneous in the vertical dimension and they share the market equally.
9
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We next analyze the innitely repeated game for the cases of full collusion and partial collu-
sion. We then compare our results and we relate them to the case where rms always behave
noncooperatively. Finally, we compare the stability of both types of collusion.
3.1 Full Collusion
Assume that all rms in the market collude (case FC). Then all rms maximize their joint
prot FC :=
P2
j=0 j and charge collusive prices.
19 The maximization problem is given by
max
p0; p1; p20
FC = p0D0 + p1D1 + p2D2.
We impose the following constraints: First, the market is always covered and each rm obtains
a strictly positive market share. Second, all consumers realize a nonnegative utility when buying
one of the o¤ered products. In the Appendix we show that these constraints pin down the
equilibrium under full collusion. The branded rms set the same price (they are both symmetric)
such that the indi¤erent consumer located at x = 1=2 gets a utility of zero. The private label
rm then sets a price such that the indi¤erent consumers located at x = 1=6 and x = 5=6
obtain also a utility of zero and are therefore indi¤erent between buying the private label good
or the next branded good. In addition, we also derive the optimal deviation prices where we
impose that the maximal market share of the deviating rm is less than 100 per cent. The
following proposition states the fully collusive prices and prots as well as the deviation prices
and deviation prots.
Proposition 2. Consider collusion by all three rms. We obtain the following equilibrium
values:
i) Prices: pFCi = 1   t=6, for i = 1; 2, and pFC0 = s   t=6, so that pFC0  pFCi holds (with
equality holding at s = 1).
ii) Prots: FCi = 1=3  t=18, for i = 1; 2 and FC0 = s=3  t=18.
19We follow Donsimoni (1985) and Athey and Bagwell (2001) who select the collusive outcome which maximizes
joint prots (see Bos and Harrington, 2010, and Thomadsen and Rhee, 2007, for discussions of this issue and for
related literature).
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iii) Demands: Firm 0 serves consumers located at [0; 1=6) [ (5=6; 1]. Firms 1 and 2 serve
consumers located at (1=6; 1=2) and at (1=2; 5=6), respectively.
iv) Deviation by rm i, i = 1; 2: The deviation prices and prots are pD;FCi = t=12 + 1=2
and D;FCi = (t+ 6)
2 =(144t), respectively.
v) Deviation by rm 0: The deviation price and prots are pD;FC0 = t=12+s=2 and 
D;FC
0 =
(6s+ t)2 =(144t), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
Parts i) and ii) of Proposition 2 state the collusive prices and prots when all three rms
collude. The rms charge higher prices than in the noncooperative case. According to part iii)
of Proposition 2, each rms market share is 1=3. It also implies that the demand for the private
label good increases compared to the noncooperative case, while the market share of the brands
is reduced accordingly.
Parts iv) and v) give the deviation prices and prots of the rms. The deviating rm
undercuts its rivals by setting a lower price; it then obtains a higher market share and a higher
prot. The number of consumers served depends on the transportation cost parameter. We
assume that the transportation cost is large enough, so that the deviating rm obtains a market
share of less than 100 per cent (which is ensured by t  6=11; see Assumption 1).
3.2 Partial Collusion
In the case of partial collusion (PC), rms 1 and 2 collude, while rm 0 behaves noncooperatively.
Let pPCi denote the price of rm i, for i = 1; 2, and let p
PC
0 be the noncooperative price set
by rm 0 under partial collusion. The colluding brands maximize their joint prot. Their
maximization problem is given by
max
p1;p20
PC = p1D1 + p2D2,
while the maximization problem of rm 0 is
max
p00
0 = p0D0.
Solving the maximization problems gives rise to a set of rst-order conditions which determine
the equilibrium outcome.
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Proposition 3. Consider partial collusion between rms 1 and 2, while rm 0 behaves nonco-
operatively. We obtain the following equilibrium values:
i) Prices: pPCi = 5t=9+(1 s)=3, for i = 1; 2, and pPC0 = 4t=9 (1 s)=3, so that pPC0 < pPCi
holds always.
ii) Prots: PC0 = (4t  3(1  s))2 =(81t) and PCi = (5t+ 3(1  s))2 =(162t), for i = 1; 2.
iii) Demands: Firm 0 serves consumers located at [0; xPC0 )[ (xPC2 ; 1], where xPC0 > xN0 and
xPC2 < x
N
2 . Firm 1 serves consumers located at (x
PC
0 ; 1=2) and rm 2 at (1=2; x
PC
2 ), respectively.
Moreover, xPC0 = (4t  3(1  s)) =(18t), xPC1 = 1=2, and xPC2 = (14t+ 3(1  s)) =(18t).
iv) If rm i, i = 1; 2, deviates from partial collusion, then its price and prots are pD;PCi =
(1  s)=4 + 5t=12 and D;PCi = ((1  s)=4 + 5t=12)2 =t, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
Part iii) of Proposition 3 says when the two brands collude, they reduce their market shares
and serve less consumers compared to the noncooperative case. Part iv) of Proposition 3 states
that a brand could deviate from the collusive agreement by charging a lower price than those
set by the rival rms. Such a deviation increases its prots.
3.3 Comparison of Results
By comparing the results derived so far, we can order rmsprices, demands and prots under
the three di¤erent types of conduct (noncooperative, partially collusive, and fully collusive).
Corollary 1. By comparing the equilibrium prices under noncooperation, full and partial col-
lusion, we get: pFCj > p
PC
j > p
N
j , for j = 0; 1; 2.
Proof. Follows directly from comparing the equilibrium prices as stated in Propositions 1-3.
Corollary 1 states that prices are increasing when rmsconduct becomes more collusive.
Prices are maximal when there is full collusion. They remain higher under partial collusion than
under noncooperative behavior. Combining the latter observation with the fact that the private
label rm sets a lower price than the branded goods producers in case of a partial cartel (see
Proposition 3), we get that the brandsprices serve as an umbrella such that the private labels
price increases above the fully noncooperative price.20
20 In the EU, umbrella e¤ects are potentially becoming more important for the assessment of the harm created
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Corollary 2. By comparing the equilibrium demands under noncooperation, full and partial
collusion, we get the following orderings:
i) DFC0 > D
N
0 , D
PC
0 > D
N
0 and D
PC
0 > D
FC
0 for s > 1  t=3.
ii) DNi > D
FC
i , D
N
i > D
PC
i and D
FC
i > D
PC
i , for s > 1  t=3 with i = 1; 2.
iii) DFC0 = D
FC
1 = D
FC
2 = 1=3.
Proof. Follows directly from calculating rms demands (7) by using the locations of the
indi¤erent consumers as stated in Propositions 1-3.
By comparing the equilibrium demands, we notice that the brands serve the highest share of
the market in the noncooperative case. Each brand serves more than one third of the market.
Under full collusion all rms share the demand equally. Under partial collusion, brands charge a
higher price than under full collusion and serve less consumers; thus, both rmsmarket shares
become smaller than one third.
Corollary 3. By comparing the equilibrium prots under noncooperation, full and partial col-
lusion, we get the following orderings:
i) FCi > 
PC
i > 
N
i , for i = 1; 2.
ii) FC0 > 
N
0 and 
PC
0 > 
N
0 hold always.
iii) FC0 > 
PC
0 if s > s
(t) :=
h
t  3p3pt (4  3t)i =6+1 and FC0 < PC0 if s < s(t) (with
equality holding at s = s(t)). Moreover, @s(t)=@t > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 3 states that rmsprots are always higher under collusion (both partial and full
collusion) compared to the prots under noncooperative behavior. Full collusion always leads
to higher prots than partial collusion for the brand producers, i = 1; 2, which is not the case
for the private label rm. In fact, the private label rm can realize higher prots under partial
collusion than under full collusion. This observation is important for the stability of full and
partial collusion, respectively.21 If s < s(t), then it is optimal for the private label rm not
by a cartel in private law suits. According to the new EU Damages Directive (see EU, 2014) members of a
cartel can be held responsible for higher prices independently charged by rms competing with cartel members.
Umbrella pricing then refers to a market outcome, where independent rms increased their prices in response to
the cartels price increases.
21This result is related to Donsimoni (1985) who analyzed cartel stability when rms di¤er in costs (but produce
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to join the brand manufacturers for a full collusion outcome, given that the brands keep their
collusive conduct (i.e., partial collusion is realized).
The reason is that the market share of the private label rm always increases under partial
collusion when compared with its market share under full collusion. In the former case, the
private labels market share on the segment x 2 [0; 1=3] is xFC0 = 1=6 and in the latter case
the private labels market share is xPC0 = (4t  3(1  s)) =(18t). We then get xPC0 > xFC0 if
s > 1  t=3 (see Corollary 2). Note also that @(xPC0  xFC0 )=@t = (1 s)=(6t2) > 0 holds, so that
the di¤erence of the market shares is increasing in t. Accordingly, from part iii) of Corollary
3, we can infer that PC0 > 
FC
0 only becomes feasible when t > 6=5 holds. It means that
for the prot of the private label being larger under partial collusion than under full collusion,
the increase in the market share must be large enough to compensate for the price decrease.
In line with this observation, part iii) of Corollary 3 also states that the critical value s(t) is
increasing in t. This means that the range of the quality parameter s for which partial collusion
is preferred by the private label rm increases in t. Thus, everything else equal, a reduced
competitive intensity (high value of t) makes it more likely that the private label rm prefers
partial collusion over full collusion.
Corollary 4. Comparing the optimal deviation prices and prots under full and partial collusion,
we get the following orderings:
i) D;FCj > 
FC
j and p
D;FC
j < p
FC
j with j = 0; 1; 2.
ii) D;PCj > 
PC
j and p
D;PC
j < p
PC
j with j = 0; 1; 2.
Proof. Follows directly from comparing the respective values as stated in Propositions 2-3.
Corollary 4 states that rms always deviate by charging a lower price to earn a higher prot.
This result also implies that rmscritical discount factor (3) is always in the range between
zero and one.
3.4 Stability Analysis
Collusion is sustainable if the discount factor (3) is large enough. Full collusion is stable if
  FCj holds for all j = 0; 1; 2. Partial collusion is stable, whenever   FCi holds for all
a homogenous good). He showed that the most e¢ cient rms always join the cartel while the less e¢ cient rms
could stay outside.
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i = 1; 2. The critical discount factor of the brand producers i = 1; 2 under full collusion is given
by
FCi =
D;FCi   FCi
D;FCi   Ni
=
75 (2  t)2
 48s2 + 160st+ 96s  125t2   60t+ 252 , (8)
where @FCi =@s < 0 and @
FC
i =@t < 0. Thus, the critical discount factor 
FC
i is reduced
(implying that full collusion is easier to sustain) when the transportation cost parameter and/or
the quality parameter of the private label are increasing. Intuitively, when s increases the prot
in the noncooperative stage game (see part ii) of Proposition 1) is reduced which lowers the
expected prot of deviation. The noncooperative stage game prot is realized in the punishment
phase after the deviation period. At the same time, both the fully collusive prot and the prot
in the deviation stage are independent of private labels quality. Thus a higher quality of the
private label makes full collusion easier to sustain (lower value of FCi ). Increasing horizontal
product di¤erentiation increases the likelihood of full collusion as in Ross (1992).
The critical discount factor of rm the private label rm under full collusion is given by
FC0 =
D;FC0   FC0
D;FC0   N0
=
75 (2s  t)2
108s2   220st+ 384s  125t2 + 320t  192 , (9)
where it can be shown that @FC0 =@s > 0 and @
FC
0 =@t < 0. The former derivative says that the
private label rms incentive to collude is reduced when s increases. This is due to the fact that
in the punishment phase the prot of the private label good increases the smaller the quality
gap becomes, so that the expected prot in the punishment phase increases in s. As for the
brands, the incentive constraint of the private label rm is more likely to be fullled when the
transportation cost parameter increases (i.e., horizontal product di¤erentiation is high).
The critical discount factor of the brand producers i = 1; 2 under partial collusion is given
by
PCi =
D;PCi   PCi
D;PCi   Ni
=
25
81
, (10)
so that the stability of partial collusion among the brand producers neither depends on the
intensity of competition t nor on the private labels quality s. Thus partial collusion between
the branded products is immune against changes of the quality of the private label good and
changing intensities of competition.22 We summarize the comparison and properties of the
22This may explain the relative stability of recently detected partial cartels among branded manufacturers in
Germany as mentioned in the Introduction.
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critical discount factors as follows.
Proposition 4. The orderings of the critical discount factors are as follows:
i) FC0 < 
FC
i holds always (equality holding at s = 1).
ii) FCi < 
PC
i ( 
FC
i > 
PC
i ) holds if s > s(t) ( s < s(t)), with equality holding at s = s(t),
where s(t) := 5t=3  (p201t  44t2   126)=3 + 1. Moreover, @s(t)=@t < 0 and @2s(t)=@t2 > 0.
Furthermore, @FCi =@s < 0, @
FC
i =@t < 0, @
FC
0 =@s > 0, and @
FC
0 =@t < 0 hold always.
Finally, @PCi =@s = @
PC
i =@t = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Part i) of Proposition 4 states that the brand producers are critical for sustaining full col-
lusion.23 If the discount factor is high enough such that the brand producers collude, then the
private label rms incentive constraint is also fullled (in the special case s = 1, all rms have
the same quality levels, so that their incentive conditions are the same as well). Part ii) shows
that either full collusion or partial collusion is easier to sustain. There exists a critical value s(t)
such that for s > s(t) full collusion is easier to sustain than partial collusion. If this condition is
reversed, then the opposite holds with partial collusion being easier to sustain than full collusion.
The function s(t) consists of all pairs (t; s) at which the critical discount factors under full and
partial collusion are the same. This function is convex and negatively sloped in a (t; s) diagram
over the feasible set. This means that relatively large values of s and t make it more likely that
full collusion is easier to sustain than partial collusion. Or put di¤erently, partial collusion is
easier to sustain than full collusion when the values of s and t are relatively low.24
Figure 1 illustrates the critical discount factors as functions of s when we set the parameter
value t = 1. The upward sloping curve represents the critical discount factor of the private label
rm (thin line) which is never binding for s < 1. If the incentive constraint for full collusion is
fullled for the branded rms, then it is also fullled for the private label rm. Comparison of
23This result is also obtained in Häckner (1994) who shows that it is always the high quality rm which has
the largest deviation incentives.
24 If we allow for prices under full collusion which take care of the incentive constraint of the brand producers,
then the critical discount factor can be reduced for the brands (see Bos and Harrington, 2010). This would
mean that the private label had to increase its price to shift revenues to the branded rms. However, such an
optimization problem is also constrained by the private label rms participation constrained as given by part iii)
of Corollary 3.
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Figure 1: dashed line: FCi ; thin line: 
FC
0 ; bold line: 
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i
the critical discount factors of the brand producers under full collusion (dashed line) and under
partial collusion (bold line) shows that full collusion is easier to sustain than partial collusion
when s is larger than the threshold value s, (which is reached at the intersection of both curves),
while the opposite holds for lower values of s. Thus, full collusion is, ceteris paribus, easier to
sustain than partial collusion if the quality gap of the private label good is not too large.
From Corollary 3 (which states rmsprot levels under the three types of conduct) we know
that the brand producers always prefer full collusion over partial collusion, while both types of
collusion are preferred over noncooperative behavior. The private label rm also realizes the
lowest prot level under noncooperative behavior. In contrast to the brand producers, the private
label rm, however, may prefer partial collusion over full collusion. Assuming that the rms
select the type of conduct which maximizes their prots and taking into account the feasibility
of collusion, we get the following market conduct depending on rmsdiscount factors (the same
stability criterion is applied in Bos and Harrington, 2010).
Proposition 5. Depending on the discount factor , rms market conduct is as follows:
i) If  > maxfFCi ; PCi g, then market conduct is FC if s > s, whereas it is PC if s < s.
ii) If FCi >  > 
PC
i , then market conduct is PC.
iii) If PCi >  > 
FC
i , then market conduct is FC.
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iv) If  < minfFCi ; PCi g, then market conduct is N .
Proof. Follows from combining the results of Proposition 5 with part iii) of Corollary 3.
Part i) of Proposition 5 refers to the case, where rmsdiscount factor is su¢ ciently large
to make both full collusion and partial collusion stable. In this area, the private label rms
preference for either type of collusion determines the market conduct. From Corollary 3, part
iii), we know that the private label rm prefers partial collusion if s > s, whereas the opposite
holds for s < s. The type of conduct then follows immediately from the private label rms
preference. Interestingly, we notice that the private label rm prefers partial collusion over full
collusion in the parameter area, where full collusion is easier to sustain than partial collusion
from the brand producersperspective. A prediction of the likely market conduct only based
on the critical discount factors would be misleading in those instances. One has to consider the
incentives of the private label rm to join the brand manufacturers in their collusive conduct
or to behave noncooperatively. Inspection of the critical value s yields that full collusion is
always the outcome for low values of t (precisely, t < 6=5), while in the remaining parameter
area partial collusion is preferred by the private label rm only if s < s(t). In that area it holds
that intense competition (low value of t) makes, ceteris paribus, full collusion more likely (given
that both types of collusion are feasible). In the same way, it follows from the shape of s, that
low values of s tend to make partial collusion more likely, while for large values of s it becomes
less likely.
Part ii) deals with cases where partial collusion is easier to sustain than full collusion. If
rms discount factor allows only for partial collusion, it will also be the market conduct chosen
by the rms. Part iii) refers to the opposite case, where full collusion is easier to sustain than
partial collusion, while only the former is feasible. Clearly, in this case full collusion is the type
of conduct selected by the rms.
Finally, part iv) gives the case where neither type of collusion is incentive compatible, so
that noncooperative behavior is the market conduct. A noncooperative outcome is more likely
the larger the quality gap and/or the more intense competition. This follows directly from
@FCi =@s < 0 and @
FC
i =@t < 0, so that an increasing quality of the private label good and
reduced competition make full collusion easier to sustain. The former relation is in line with
Steiners (2004) observation that private labelsquality has been increasing, while signs of col-
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lusion between brands and private label goods have also emerged more recently.
Figure 2 illustrates our results presented in Proposition 5. The thin lines represent the
constraints of the feasible set as specied in Assumption 1.25 The upward sloping dashed curve
is the locus of all pairs (t; s) such that the private label rm is indi¤erent between partial and
full collusion. It represents the critical value s(t) as specied in part iii) of Corollary 3. The
private label rm gets a higher (lower) prot under full collusion than under partial collusion
northeast (southwest) of the dashed curve. Inspection of the dashed curve s(t) yields that t
must pass a minimal value (namely, et = 6=5 where s(et) = s(et) holds), so that partial collusion
can be more attractive than full collusion for the private label rm. Only if the intensity of
competition is su¢ ciently low (t > 6=5) partial collusion can be preferred by the private label
rm. In that range, however, the private labels quality must not surpass the critical value s(t)
(dashed curve), to get partial collusion instead of full collusion (while assuming that both are
feasible).
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.0
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s
Figure 2: colored lines: feasible set; bold curve: s(t); dashed curve: s(t)
25The colored lines describe the feasible set as specied in Assumption 1. The red line represents s  1, the blue
line s  1  5t=6, the green line s  t=2, and the yellow line s  13t=6  2. Note also that t = tmin = 6=11 holds
at the origin of the graph. Of course, the following discussion of Figure 2 only refers to the range of parameters
within the feasible set.
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The downward sloping bold curve in Figure 2 depicts the critical value s(t) which is the
locus of all (t; s) pairs where the critical discount factors of the brand producers are equal under
full and partial collusion. Full collusion is easier (harder) to sustain than partial collusion for
all (t; s) pairs northeast (southwest) of the bold curve. Interestingly, exactly when full collusion
is easier to sustain than partial collusion (i.e., we are in the area northeast of the bold curve),
then it can happen that the private label rm prefers partial collusion over full collusion.
The intensity of competition is measured by the parameter t. If the intensity of competition
is large (low value of t), then full collusion becomes harder to sustain, so that partial collusion
is more likely. In contrast to this observation (which relies on the brand producersincentives
to engage in full or partial collusion), the private label producer tends to prefer partial collusion
over full collusion when the intensity of competition is reduced (high value of t). With regard
to vertical quality di¤erentiation (parameter s), both the incentives of the brand manufacturers
and the private label producer are more in line. An increase of the quality of the private label
makes it more likely that the incentive constraint of the brand producers is fullled and that
the private label producer prefers full collusion over partial collusion.
4 Extensions and Discussion
In this section we analyze the private label rms incentives to improve its quality. We also
show how our results can be used to detect collusive conduct from market data. This argument
is based on the markedly di¤erent market responses to an improvement of the private labels
quality under the three types of market conduct (noncooperative, partially or fully collusive).
Strategic choice of private label quality. The incentive of the private label producer to close
the quality gap, 1   s, between the private labels and the brandsqualities critically depends
on the type of conduct. Assume an initial decision knot, where the private labels quality is
set before the innitely repeated market game starts. Suppose that the type of market conduct
is xed being either N , PC or FC. Taking the total derivative of the private label producers
expected ow of prots (around the equilibrium values p0, p1, and p2 under the three di¤erent
conduct regimes) with respect to the quality parameter s yields
d0
ds
=
@0
@s
+
@0
@p0
dp0
ds
+
2X
i=1
@0
@pi
dpi
ds
, (11)
20
where we canceled out the factor 1=(1   ). The rst term of the right-hand side of (11) is
the direct e¤ect of a change in s on the private label rms prot which is positive but di¤erent
depending on the type of market conduct. The second term on the right-hand side is zero because
of the envelope theorem. The third term on the right-hand side represents the strategic e¤ect
of the quality investment. It is noteworthy that it is negative under N and PC (because both
dpNi =ds and dp
PC
i =ds are strictly negative), but disappears under FC (because of dp
FC
i =ds = 0).
In the parlance of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), there exists an investment reducing strategic
e¤ect under N and PC (puppy dog ploy), while there is no such e¤ect present under FC. Not
surprisingly, marginal investment incentives are largest under FC, what can be derived from
calculating the total derivatives of (11) under the three di¤erent types of market conduct.
Proposition 6. The private label rms marginal incentives to close the quality gap 1   s
are largest under FC with PC and N following in that order; i.e., dFC0 =ds > d
PC
0 =ds >
dN0 =ds > 0 hold always.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Proposition 4 and Corollary 3, we know that an increase of the quality of the private
label makes full collusion more likely because of the following two reasons. First, a higher
value of s makes it easier for brand producers to sustain full collusion; i.e., @FCi =@s < 0. As
@PCi =@s = 0 holds, full collusion becomes relatively easier to sustain than partial collusion the
larger s becomes (see Proposition 4). Second, a higher value of s makes full collusion more
attractive than partial collusion for the private label rm (part iii) of Corollary 3).
Suppose now a generic change in s, say from s1 to s2, with s1 < s2 such that this increase in
the private labels quality changes market conduct from noncooperative (N) or partially collusive
(PC) to fully collusive (FC). Investment incentives, which are given by the prot di¤erential
FC0 (s2) C0 (s1) (with C = FC;PC;N) are then driven only by the replacement e¤ect and the
following result follows immediately.26
Proposition 7. Suppose a generic increase of the private labels quality from s1 to s2 with
s1 < s2 which changes market conduct from N or PC to FC. The private label rms incentives
26Note that a change from N to PC is not possible through an increase of s as PCi does not depend on s.
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to close the quality gap 1  s are then ordered as follows:
FC0 (s2)  N0 (s1) > FC0 (s2)  PC0 (s1) > FC0 (s2)  FC0 (s1) > 0.
Proof. Follows directly from FC0 > 
PC
0 > 
N
0 .
Proposition 7 follows from the ordering of the private label rms prot under the three
di¤erent types of market conduct. The private label producer has larger investment incentives
the lower the degree of collusion, because the net gain from a quality increase is higher when
competition is more intense initially.27
These observations have two implications: First, an increase in the quality of the private
label may be strategic so as to obtain a full collusion outcome as the type of market conduct
chosen by the rms. Second, an increase in the quality of the private label may have signicant
adverse e¤ects for consumers, whenever it is used to trigger a full collusion outcome. In fact,
incentives to close the quality gap between the private label good and the brands are maximal
whenever noncooperative behavior would prevail without any investment. Such a constellation
is obtained if FCi (s1) >  > 
FC
i (s2) holds.
The pro-collusive e¤ect of a higher quality of the private label good sheds new light on
the possible market e¤ects of so-called premium private label goods. While the trend of an
increasing quality of private label goods has been generally interpreted as pro-competitive, our
investigation highlights their role in stabilizing full collusion between private label and brand
producers.
Identifying collusive conduct. The following Table 1 describes the change in the prices of the
brands and the private label depending on an improvement of the private labels quality s. Rows
2-4 relate to cases where the type of conduct is xed as being noncooperative, partially collusive
or fully collusive, respectively. The fth row refers to those instances where initially conduct
is either noncooperative or partially collusive, while a quality improvement of the private label
induces a fully collusive outcome.
27A qualitatively similar result is stated in Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006) where a drastic innovation is
considered.
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Conduct Brandsprices Private labels price
N # (by   15) " (by 25)
PC # (by   13) " (by 13)
FC no change " (by 1)
switch to FC " "
Table 1: E¤ects of an increase in s on brandsand private labels prices
Two observations are noteworthy: First, given that the type of conduct is xed at N , PC
or FC, the private labels price is the more quality-sensitive, the more collusive the market
conduct becomes (Table 1 states in the third column the sign of the own-price e¤ect and the
marginal e¤ect is given in brackets). If the type of conduct changes through an increase in s to
full collusion (see last row of Table 1), then the change in the private labels price is a discrete
jump upward. Second, full collusion can be inferred from the absence of a negative sensitivity of
the brandsprices with respect to the private labels quality. According to Table 1, the brands
prices stay put if full collusion prevails. The price e¤ect is even positive for the branded goods
if a higher private label quality leads to fully collusive conduct.28
Incidentally, Ward et al. (2002) showed in their empirical analysis of scanner data (obtained
at cash registers) from US grocery stores that an increasing market share of private labels tends
to increase the brandsprices. While this can be explained by same static theories of product
di¤erentiation and vertical relations, our model suggests that such an outcome can also result
from a combination of an increasing private label quality and collusive conduct.
The relations stated in Table 1 suggest two empirical strategies to identify collusion in
markets where brands and private labels compete. From the rst observation it follows that
the private labels own price response to a quality improvement is the larger the more collusive
industry conduct becomes. The second observation suggests that fully collusive behavior can be
inferred from a nonnegative price e¤ect of the brands resulting from an increase of the private
labels quality.
28See Gabrielsen and Sörgard (2007) for a vertical restraint theory which also shows that branded suppliers
could increase their prices in the presence of a private label (particularly of poor perceived quality). See also Gilo
(2008) for a survey of vertical restraints leading to a cartel outcome between retailer controlled private labels and
branded goods.
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5 Conclusion
We have analyzed collusion between brands and a private label substitute. We focused on
heterogeneity of rms due to product di¤erentiation; both horizontal and vertical. We assumed
that nonparticipation of the private label producer in a cartel does not necessarily lead to fully
noncooperative behavior, but may induce the brand manufacturers to form a partial cartel. In
fact, forming such a partial cartel is always optimal for the brand producers when being incentive
compatible. Given that both partial and full collusion are feasible, the private label rm is more
likely to revert to noncooperative behavior (with a partial cartel following), if horizontal and/or
vertical di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently large. Thus, focusing on the private labels incentive to
participate in a full cartel, we get that this is more likely whenever product di¤erentiation
(vertical and/or horizontal) is low enough.
Interestingly, this picture is di¤erent when considering the brand producersincentive condi-
tions. Then a higher degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation works in favor of full collusion,
while the quality gap of the private label must not be too large. Thus, comparing the brand
producersincentive constraints gives the result, that full collusion is more likely when horizontal
product di¤erentiation is large but vertical di¤erentiation is low. Taking both results together,
we nd that exactly in the parameter range, where full collusion is easier to sustain than partial
collusion (from brandsperspective), it could happen that the private label producer opts for
a partial collusion outcome by behaving noncooperatively. For this to happen, horizontal and
vertical di¤erentiation must be su¢ ciently large.
The partial collusion case has two characteristic features which merit mentioning. First,
the stability conditions of the brand manufacturers are independent of the degree of product
di¤erentiation (both horizontal and vertical). Second, the private label rm can increase its price
under partial collusion above the equilibrium price under fully noncooperative conduct. The rst
observation can be used to explain the remarkable stability of cartels among brand manufacturers
even in an environment in which the degree of competition and the private labels quality change
over time. The second result is potentially important for the assessment of the harm created
by a cartel that only involves explicit collusion among the brand manufacturers. As private
law suits also allow for damages created by a cartels umbrella e¤ects on outsidersprices the
question emerges whether or not the outsiders did join the explicit cartel by colluding tacitly (so
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that in fact a full cartel was in operation) or whether the outsiders behaved noncooperatively
(in which case the cartel was partial). In both instances, the outsiders increase their prices,
however, by di¤erent amounts.
We have also analyzed the private labels incentive to increase its quality. We showed that
it is maximal under full collusion with partial collusion and noncooperative behavior following
in that order. In addition, a quality increase makes full collusion more likely because of two
reasons: First, it relaxes the brand producersincentive constraint for full collusion. Second, it
makes it more likely that the private label rm prefers full collusion over partial collusion. The
latter observation has also implications for the competitive assessment of private label goods.
As long as private label goods were of the budget type, private label producers had only little
incentives to join into a full cartel, while branded rms found it also easier to sustain a partial
cartel. This may have changed as private labelsquality increased over time. As the quality gap
becomes smaller, private label rms and branded producers should have found it more attractive
to form an all encompassing cartel.
We have also shown that the price responses associated with a quality improvement of the
private label good can give important information for detecting cartelization. First, if a quality
increase does not induce a negative e¤ect on brand producersprices (everything else equal), then
either full collusion is present or the market is triggered into fully collusive conduct. Second, the
larger the private labels own-price e¤ect of a quality increase, the more likely it is that collusive
conduct exists in the market.
Appendix
In this Appendix we present the missing proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using rmsdemand functions (7), we can write the rmsprots as
0 = D0p0 = (x0 + 1  x2)p0, (12)
1 = D1p1 = (x1   x0)p1, and (13)
2 = D2p2 = (x2   x1)p2. (14)
Substituting the values of the indi¤erent consumers (4), (5), and (6) into these expressions, we
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get
0 = p0 (6s+ 2t  6p0 + 3p1 + 3p2   6) =(6t),
1 = p1 (2t  3s+ 3p0   6p1 + 3p2 + 3) =(6t), and
2 = p2 (2t  3s+ 3p0 + 3p1   6p2 + 3) =(6t).
Maximization of each rms prot gives the following system of rst-order conditions:
(6s+ 2t  12p0 + 3p1 + 3p2   6) =(6t) = 0,
(2t  3s+ 3p0   12p1 + 3p2 + 3) =(6t) = 0, and
(2t  3s+ 3p0 + 3p1   12p2 + 3) =(6t) = 0.
All prot functions are strictly concave, so that this system of rst-order conditions determines
the unique equilibrium outcome. Solving for the prices we get the following equilibrium values
as stated in part i) of the proposition:
pN0 = (6(s  1) + 5t)=15 and
pNi = (3(1  s) + 5t)=15 for i = 1; 2.
Substituting the equilibrium prices into (4), (5), and (6), we get the equilibrium locations of the
indi¤erent consumers (see part iii) of the proposition)
xN0 = 1=6  (1  s)=(5t), (15)
xN1 = 1=2, and (16)
xN2 = 5=6 + (1  s)=(5t). (17)
Note that xN0 2 (0; 1=3) and xN2 2 (2=3; 1) must hold in an interior solution. This is true for
s > 1 5t=6 which is implied by Assumption 1. Substituting the equilibrium prices and locations
of the indi¤erent consumers into the prot functions (12), (13), and (14) yields
N0 = (6(s  1) + 5t)2 =(225t) and
N1 = 
N
2 = (5t+ 3(1  s))2 =(225t),
which are stated in part ii) of the proposition. We nally check whether the utilities of the
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indi¤erent consumers (15), (16), and (17) are nonnegative. We obtain
UxN0
= UxN2
= (2s+ 3)=5  t=2 and
UxN1
= (s+ 4)=5  t=2.
Setting UxN0 ; UxN1 ; UxN2 > 0, we get the condition s > 5t=4  3=2, which holds by Assumption 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider collusion by all three rms. The three rms maximize their
joint prot
max
pFC0 ; p
FC
1 ; p
FC
2 0
FC = p0D0 + p1D1 + p2D2
subject to consumersreservation utilities (which must be nonnegative). Substituting the de-
mand functions into FC and di¤erentiating with respect to the prices, we get the following
system of rst-order conditions
(3s+ t  6p0 + 3p1 + 3p2   3) =(3t) = 0 and
(2t  3s+ 6p0   12pi + 6pi0 + 3) =(6t) = 0, for i; i0 = 1; 2, i 6= i0.
This system of rst-order conditions is only fullled at t = 0. Hence, there cannot exist an
interior solution to the maximization problem. We next show that Assumption 1 ensures that
the joint prot is maximized in the corner solution where all indi¤erent consumers get a utility
of zero, while the branded goods prices p1 and p2 are the same and the market is fully covered.
Suppose that all indi¤erent consumers get a utility of zero; i.e., Ux0 = Ux1 = Ux2 = 0 holds.
Firms 1 and 2 are symmetric, hence, the location of the indi¤erent consumer is x1 = 1=2 with
p1 = p2. Substituting theses values into Ux1=1=2 = 0, we get the following equilibrium prices of
the brands under full collusion
pFC1 = p
FC
2 = 1  t=6. (18)
We assume that the market is always covered. Therefore, the utility of the indi¤erent consumer
on the segments (0; 1=3) and (2=3; 1) must be zero, Ux0 = Ux2 = 0. By substituting (4) and the
collusive prices of the brands (18) into the utility functions we get the price for the private label
good from the indi¤erent consumers:
pFC0 = s  t=6. (19)
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Given the prices of the brands (18), we still have to check whether it is indeed optimal to set
the price pFC0 = s  t=6 which ensures that the market is fully covered. Note rst that the joint
prot can never increase with a lower price for the private label, because pFC0 < p
FC
i for i = 1; 2.
However, we still have to ensure that there is no incentive to set a higher price for the private
label than pFC0 . If this were optimal, the market would not be covered. In other words, under
a higher collusive price charged by the private label there is a new indi¤erent consumer whose
address is x0 = (s  p0)=t < 1=6 on the segment (0; 1=3) (correspondingly, the new location on
the segment (2=3; 1) is then x0 = 1   (s   p0)=t < 5=6). Hence, given the prices of the brands
(18), the joint prot cannot be increased by a price of the private label which is higher than
pFC0 if
pFC0  bp0 with bp0 := argmaxp0 D0(p0)p0.
Solving the maximization problem
max
p0
D0(p0)p0 = max
p0
1
t
2p0 (s  p0) (20)
gives
bp0 = 1
2
s
which implies
bp0  pFC0 if and only if s  13 t.
The latter inequality is assumed in Assumption 1.29 Again, it ensures that the market is fully
covered under full collusion. We have, therefore, proven part i) and part iii) of the proposition.
The indi¤erent consumer between the private label and brand 1 (2) is located at x0 = 1=6
(x2 = 5=6). Substituting the equilibrium prices and locations of the indi¤erent consumers into
the prot functions (12), (13), and (14) yields the prots under full collusion (as stated in part
ii) of the proposition)
FC0 = s=3  t=18 and (21)
FC1 = 
FC
2 = 1=3  t=18.
29Applying the same deviation analsis to the brands, we get that joint prots cannot increased with a higher
brand price if t  3.
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The sum of all rmsprots under full collusion is then given by
FC = (s+ 2)=3  t=6.
Derivation of the deviation prots. We rst solve the deviation problem of one of the brand
producers which are symmetric. Next we solve the deviation problem of the private label rm.
Case 1 (deviation by rm 1): If rm 1 deviates, it charges a deviation price pD;FC1 . Sub-
stituting the collusive prices (18)-(19) into (4) and (5), we get the locations of the indi¤erent
consumers depending on rm 1s deviation price:
xD;FC0 =

t+ 2pD;FC1   2

=(4t) and (22)
xD;FC1 =

5t  6pD;FC1 + 6

=(12t). (23)
Note that we must ensure that xD;FC1   xD;FC0 < 1. Firm 1 maximizes its deviation prot
max
pD;FC1 0
D;FC1 = p
D;FC
1 (x
D;FC
1   xD;FC0 ).
By substituting the locations of the indi¤erent consumers (22) and (23) into the prot function
and solving the maximization problem, we nd the optimal deviation price of rm 1:
pD;FC1 = t=12 + 1=2.
Note that the optimal deviation price of the brand pD;FC1 is smaller than the collusive price p
FC
i
for all t < 2 which holds by Assumption 1. Substituting the optimal deviation price into (22)
and (23), we get the locations of the indi¤erent consumers
xD;FC0 = (7t  6) =(24t) and
xD;FC1 = (3t+ 2) =(8t).
We must check whether the demand of the deviating rm is smaller than one, xD;FC1  xD;FC0 < 1.
This is true if t  6=11 which is assumed in Assumption 1. The deviation prot is then given
by
D;FC1 = (t+ 6)
2 =(144t).
This proves part iv) of the proposition.
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Case 2 (deviation by rm 0): Substituting the collusive prices into (4) and (6), we get the
locations of the indi¤erent consumers depending on the private label rms deviation price:
xD;FC0 =

6s+ t  6pD;FC0

=(12t) and (24)
xD;FC2 =

11t=6  s+ pD;FC0

=(2t). (25)
Again, we must ensure that xD;FC0 + 1  xD;FC2 < 1. Firm 0 maximizes its deviation prot
max
pD;FC0 0
D;FC0 = p
D;FC
0 (x
D;FC
0 + 1  xD;FC2 ).
This problem is only well dened for pD;FC0  pFC0 because in this case the market is fully
covered. For pD;FC0 > p
FC
0 the maximization problem (20) applies where we already showed
that pFC0 is optimal for s  t=3. By substituting the locations of the indi¤erent consumers (24)
and (25) into the prot function and solving the maximization problem, we nd the optimal
deviation price of rm 0:
pD;FC0 = t=12 + s=2. (26)
The optimal deviation price (26) is smaller than the collusive price of the private label (19) if
pFC0   pD;FC0  0 holds, which gives the condition
s  t
2
. (27)
Condition (27) is part of Assumption 1. Note that a deviation price of the private label larger
than the collusive price pFC0 cannot be optimal for s  t=3 as we have shown by solving the
maximization problem (20). Thus, the optimal deviation price of the private label would be the
collusive price pFC0 for t=2 > s  t=3. By Assumption 1 this case is ruled out, so that the private
label rm nds it optimal to deviate with a price which is smaller than the collusive price.
By substituting the optimal deviation price of the private label good into the locations of
the indi¤erent consumers (24) and (25), we get
xD;FC0 = (6s+ t) =(24t), and
xD;FC2 = (23t  6s) =(24t).
We must check that under deviation the demand of the private label does not exceed one,
xD;FC0 + 1   xD;FC2 < 1. This holds for t > 6s=11 which is implied by assuming t > 6=11 (see
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Assumption 1). The deviation prot of rm 0 is then given by
D;FC0 = (6s+ t)
2 =(144t).
This proves part v) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider collusion by rms 1 and 2, while rm 0 behaves noncoop-
eratively. Firms 1 and 2 maximize their joint prot
max
p1; p20
PC = p1D1 + p2D2,
while the maximization problem of rm 0 is
max
p00
0 = p0D0.
Substituting the demand functions into both problems and maximizing over the respective prices,
we get the following system of rst-order conditions:
(2t  3s+ 3p0   12pi + 6pi0 + 3) =(6t) = 0, for i; i0 = 1; 2, i 6= i0, and
(6s+ 2t  12p0 + 3p1 + 3p2   6) =(6t) = 0.
All maximization problems are strictly concave, so that the solution of this system of rst-order
conditions gives the equilibrium prices as stated in part i) of the proposition; namely,
pPC0 = 4t=9  (1  s)=3,
pPC1 = p
PC
2 = 5t=9 + (1  s)=3.
All prices are strictly positive under Assumption 1. Substituting the collusive prices into (4),
(5), and (6), we get the equilibrium locations of the indi¤erent consumers under partial collusion
(see part iii) of the proposition)
xPC0 = (4t  3(1  s)) =(18t),
xPC1 = 1=2, and
xPC2 = (14t+ 3(1  s)) =(18t).
Assumption 1 ensures that xPC0 2 (0; 1=3) and xPC2 2 (2=3; 1). Substituting the equilibrium
prices and locations of the indi¤erent consumers into the prot functions (12), (13), and (14)
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yields (part ii) of the proposition)
PC0 = (4t  3(1  s))2 =(81t), (28)
PC1 = 
PC
2 = (5t+ 3(1  s))2 =(162t).
We nally check whether the utilities of the indi¤erent consumers (15), (16), and (17) are
nonnegative. We obtain
UxPC0
= UxPC2
= (1 + s)=2  2t=3, and
UxPC1
= (s+ 2)=3  13t=18.
These utility levels are nonnegative if s > maxf13t=6   2; 4t=3   1g which is assumed in As-
sumption 1.
We next derive the deviation price and prot of one of the brand producers (both are
symmetric) as stated in part iv) of the proposition. Consider deviation by rm 1. Substituting
the collusive prices pPC0 and p
PC
2 into (4) and (5), we get the locations of the indi¤erent consumers
depending on the deviation price of rm 1:
xD;PC0 =

6s  t+ 9pD;PC1   6

=(18t) and (29)
xD;PC1 =

14t  9pD;PC1 + 3  3s

=(18t). (30)
Firm 1 maximizes its deviation prot
max
pD;PC1 0
D;PC1 = p
D;PC
1 (x
D;PC
1   xD;PC0 ).
By substituting the locations of the indi¤erent consumers (29) and (30) into the prot function
and solving the maximization problem, we nd the optimal deviation price of rm 1:
pD;PC1 = (1  s)=4 + 5t=12.
Substituting the optimal deviation price into (29) and (30), we get the locations of the indi¤erent
consumers under deviation
xD;PC0 = (15s+ 11t  15) =(72t) and
xD;PC1 = (41t  3s+ 3) =(72t).
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We can show that xD;PC1  xD;PC0 < 1 if s > 1 7t=3 which holds by Assumption 1. The deviation
prot of rm 1 is then given by
D;PC1 = (5t=12 + (1  s)=4)2 =t.
Proof of Corollary 3. The proof of parts i) and ii) of the corollary follows immediately from
comparing the respective prot levels under noncooperative behavior, full collusion and partial
collusion. Part iii) compares the prot levels of the private label rm under full collusion (21),
and under partial collusion (28). This comparison gives rise to the condition
FC0   PC0 =
 18s2 + 6st+ 36s  41t2 + 48t  18
162t
 0
which holds if and only if
s  s(t) := 1
6
t  1
2
p
3
p
t (4  3t) + 1.
Moreover,
@s(t)
@(t)
=
p
t (4  3t)
p
t (4  3t) + 9p3t  6p3

6t (4  3t)
which obtains three zeros at t 2 f0; (2=3)   (p2p41)=123; 4=3g. It is easily checked that
@s(t)=@(t) > 0 for all t 2 [(2=3)  (p2p41)=123; 4=3]. As s(t) cuts through the feasible set (as
specied in Assumption 1) over the interval t 2 [6=5; 54=41], it then follows that @s(t)=@(t) > 0
holds always.
Proof of Proposition 4. Part i) Inspecting the critical discount factors FC0 and 
FC
i (see (9)
and (8), respectively), we get that FC0 = 
FC
i holds at s = 1. To prove that 
FC
i > 
FC
0 holds
for s < 1, we rst show that FCi is monotonically decreasing in s over the relevant parameter
range. Taking the derivative with respect to the parameter s, we get
@FCi
@s
= 75 (2  t)2  160t+ 96s  96
(48s2   160st  96s+ 125t2 + 60t  252)2 ,
so that the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the term  160t+ 96s  96. This term
is negative for all s < 5t=3 + 1 which is implied by Assumption 1. Thus, @FCi =@s < 0 holds
everywhere. We next show that FC0 is monotonically increasing in s over the relevant parameter
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range. Taking the respective derivative, we get
@FC0
@s
=
 28s2t+ 96s2   76st2 + 160st  96s+ 45t3   104t2 + 48t
(108s2   220st+ 384s  125t2 + 320t  192)2 =1200 , (31)
so that the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the numerator. The numerator has two
potentially relevant roots at
s0(t) =
1
2
t and s00(t) =
 104t+ 45t2 + 48
14t  48 for t 6=
24
7
.
Further inspection yields that s > maxfs0(t); s00(t)g holds in the feasible area as specied in
Assumption 1. This implies that the numerator of the right-hand side of (31) and thus @FC0 =@s
is strictly positive in the relevant parameter range. Combining these results concerning the
slopes of both critical values with the fact that both values are equal at s = 1 gives the ordering
stated in the proposition.
Part ii) Setting FCi = 
PC
i we can calculate the unique threshold value s(t) := 5t=3  
(
p
201t  44t2   126)=3+1 which cuts through the feasible set (the expression below the square
root sign is always positive). The orderings stated in the proposition are then easily veried.
Calculating the rst and second derivative with respect to t we get
@s(t)
@t
=
1
6
88t+ 10
p 44t2 + 201t  126  201p 44t2 + 201t  126 < 0 and
@2s(t)
@t2
=
6075
4 ( 44t2 + 201t  126) 32
> 0,
where the signs hold within the considered parameter range.
Proof of Proposition 6. We have to calculate the marginal prot changes of the private label
producer under the three types of market conduct. This yields
dN0
ds
=
72s+ 60t  72
225t
,
dPC0
ds
=
18s+ 24t  18
81t
, and
dN0
ds
=
1
3
.
Comparison of those values gives the ordering stated in the proposition. It remains to show that
@FCi
@t
= 1200 (t  2) 32s  35t+ 10st  6s
2 + 24
(48s2   160st  96s+ 125t2 + 60t  252)2 < 0
34
which holds because the numerator of the right-hand side is positive if s > 56 t  56
p
t2   2t+ 16+ 83
which is implied by Assumption 1. Finally,
@FC0
@t
=
28s3 + 76s2t  176s2   45st2 + 48st+ 48s+ 20t2   24t
(108s2   220st+ 384s  125t2 + 320t  192)2 =1200 < 0
which holds because the numerator of the right-hand side is negative if
s >
22
7
  5
28
p
81t2   272t+ 256  45
28
t
which is implied by Assumption 1, again.
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